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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I seek to contextualize the fight for the (already accomplished) legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage in Portugal within the wider frame of LGBT activism in this country (Cascais, 2006), and in the 
interplay of several differently positioned activists. Within this frame, I will analyze how the theoretical work 
of Miguel Vale de Almeida (2008), in seeking to legitimize the fight for monogamous same-sex marriage, 
seems to have engaged in identitary Othering and misrepresentation vis-à-vis polyamory. Such 
misrepresentation is contingent to the non-empirical confounding of polyamory and polygamy, along with 
the essentializing of gendered dynamics in intimate relationships, and the erasure of lesbian and gay 
ethical non-monogamous relationships. Thus, by deploying similar straw-men fallacies as those used by 
conservatives to fight against LGBT rights, polyamory is (apparently) successfully critiqued and shown to 
have to subsume or silence itself to an alleged strategic essentialism required for passing legislation in 
favor of same-sex marriage. 
This paper concludes with a reflection of the (political) dangers of petitioning for silence of Othered 
identities, and how such petitions are based on the same identitary violence and disciplining that LGBT 
movements have been trying to fight for decades, and that draws on homonationalism, homonormativity 
and heterosexual privileges to affirm itself. 
KEYWORDS 
polyamory, mononormativity, LGBT, activism, strategic essentialism, Portugal 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to produce a critical account of a very specific point in time within the history 
of LGBT activism in Portugal: that of the events surrounding the legal recognition of 
monogamous same-sex marriage
1
 in Portuguese law and how some of the key LGBT 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper, the full expression “monogamous same-sex marriage” will always be used as a 
way to bring visibility to the fact that “marriage” has, amongst most western contemporary readers, a 
presupposition of monogamy already attached to it. As Daniel Chandler (2013b) argues, to use the 
expression “monogamous marriage” is to utilize “the marked form of an unmarked concept”. The very 
same author points out how the unmarked form of a concept (which would be, in this case, just “marriage”) 
“is typically dominant […] and therefore seems to be ‘neutral’, ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ […] drawing no 
attention to its invisibly privileged status”, while simultaneously making it so that “the boundaries of 
foundational oppositions, seemingly 'absolute', have to be policed because 'transgressions' are inevitable” 
(Chandler, 2013a). 
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organizations positioned themselves in relation to this political issue and especially in relation to 
one another. 
This legal hallmark happened in 2010, but most of the events that this paper refers to took 
place in 2008 and 2009. The present paper isn’t intended to give a thorough analysis of the 
debates surrounding the approval of monogamous same-sex marriage in Portugal, but to look at 
the rhetorical intersection between such a political goal and other political goals, potentially 
rendered invisible or unworthy to enter the political arena, and particularly the position assumed 
by several groups and activists in relation to PolyPortugal, the only group in Portugal that is 
dedicated specifically to polyamory activism. 
For the sake of contextualization, let it suffice to say that this fight for monogamous marriage 
comes after the legal extension of de facto cohabitation rights to monogamous same-sex 
relationships, after the Constitutional inclusion of a reference to the prohibition of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, and a hardening of penalties against hate crimes and same-sex 
domestic violence. Given how long it took for the LGBT movement to mature and attain a 
modicum of autonomy (its own voice/s), it is not without some surprise that so much has been 
formally gained. At the same time, these changes in legislation do not signify a smooth or 
enlightened attitude towards all gender and sexuality issues – as a counterpoint, it was Portugal 
who ‘invented’ the notion of monogamous civil marriage without adoption or full parental rights, 
actually inscribing in the Law the prohibition for same-sex couples to adopt (Oliveira, 2013, p. 
71). A much more nuanced, descriptive and critical historical exploration of the evolution of 
LGBT movements in Portugal is available elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this paper 
(Cascais, 2006; Oliveira, 2013; Santos, 2013). 
To this end, I shall focus my attention on the interpretation of two practically identical texts 
put forward by Miguel Vale de Almeida (2008, 2009), who was at the time a Member of 
Parliament with the Socialist Party and one of the strongest advocates for monogamous same-
sex marriage, and at the same time a well-renowned researcher and academic in Portugal. 
These texts, however, both presented in academic conferences (one in Portugal, the other one 
in Brazil), are a reply to another text, written by Sérgio Vitorino (2008), of the Panteras Rosa 
[Pink Panthers], a queer and left oriented LGBT activist group, which was later complemented 
by one other text (Vitorino, 2009) and also a group interview with other members of the Pink 
Panthers (Maia, Louro, & Vitorino, 2009).  
The first section of this text will then be dedicated to presenting, summarily, the views and 
arguments used both by Vitorino and by Vale de Almeida, followed by a critical analysis of the 
rhetorical tropes and politics involved. I will pay special attention to the creation of dichotomies 
and hierarchies between different modes of producing social and political change and 
knowledge, with a focus on the ironies produced when such dichotomies are created through a 
process of apparent challenge to dichotomous thinking. 
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The second section will look at how Miguel Vale de Almeida (mis-)represents polyamory as 
being a prime example of the radicality that stands outside concrete politics, and also attempt to 
provide evidence for the counter-factual claims presented by the author, as well as analyzing 
the rhetorical role that polyamory is made to occupy, and its connections with discriminatory 
processes of Othering. 
The third part, and the one which gives this paper its title, will focus on the notion of 
“strategic essentialism”, mobilized as a leitmotif in Vale de Almeida’s second text, and stemming 
from Spivak’s work. The aim of this part will be to resituate the meaning of strategic essentialism 
in face of Spivak’s more recent evaluation of the uses and limitations of this political strategy, 
demonstrating that Vale de Almeida’s claims about strategic essentialism do not actually fit the 
concept. 
The fourth and final part will draw on critiques of homornomativity, homonationalism and 
neo-liberal politics to contextualize the issues that surround this process of Othering, especially 
those that come from LGBT groups and who end up legitimizing the discrimination against the 
Others this movement produces. This paper intends to draw attention to how wide-spread and 
cyclical are the mechanics of coming-into-acceptance that include a disidentification against 
what is deemed ‘extreme’ or ‘unacceptable’ (precisely the place that such coming-into-
acceptance leaves open for others to occupy). It is also a response to, and a re-echoing of, 
Wilkinson’s (2013, p. 7) call for scholars to “think about how mononormativity plays out in other 
nation-states”
2
. 
The analysis that follows seeks to address conjointly three different factors: the textual 
analysis of what was written, and which includes the critical questioning of the rhetorical 
strategies deployed to achieve specific ends; the modes of textual production involved, and how 
they relate to academic practices and ethos of citing, referencing and developing evidence-
based engagements with reality and with politics; and the political performativity of the texts, as 
they have fulfilled political and activist intentions and agendas, and cannot be separated from 
their political usefulness in advancing (some) rights while fighting against others. 
2. TEXTUAL DIALOGUE, OR WHO’S ‘WE’? 
When commenting on the recent history of the Portuguese LGBT activism, Cristina Santos 
identifies a tension between, on the one hand, the “multilayered collective struggle” that allows 
for what she calls “syncretic activism” and, on the other hand, a degree of “internal dissent in 
relation to the degree of importance and prioritization” (Santos, 2013, p. 57) of other struggles 
and demands vis-à-vis the struggle for civil monogamous same-sex marriage. This dissent grew 
                                                 
2
 Though it is also beyond the scope of this paper, the present analysis should be read in the wider context 
of how different rhetoric devices are being used by different social actors to defend marriage and propriety 
in Western societies (e.g.: Emens, 2004; Sheff, 2011; Wilkinson, 2010, 2013). 
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and became more concrete over time, and reached a high point when, in 2008, Sérgio Vitorino 
sent an email to several LGBT organizations, called “Marching for what and with whom? The 
Portuguese LGBT movement at a crossroads and some impending choices”
3
, which has since 
been published online. In it, Vitorino talks about the tiredness felt by the first-wave LGBT 
activists, that many new generations feel misunderstood within the activist movement, the 
closing down of activist possibilities and their reduction to “corporative politics”, a “tendency for 
an uncritical conservatism of heterosexism’s mechanisms of integration and reproduction” and, 
ultimately, a “desire for non-creative and non-transformative ‘normalization’” (Vitorino, 2008). 
The text does not deny the importance or validity of fighting for monogamous same-sex 
marriage, but it does criticize how such a struggle is made by “presenting the LGBT population 
as a replica of the […] conservative straight couple ideal”, sacrificing the “affirmation of the 
reality that relational and familiar diversity constitutes”, and basing itself upon a very male and 
white, middle-class standard of values. Vitorino also points to a contradiction between a 
movement that, on the one hand, supported a call for a national strike in 2003 and, on the other 
hand, claimed that PolyPortugal’s presence in the organization of the LGBT Pride March is 
reason enough for some of the organizations to refuse to participate in the March (as was the 
case with the Rede ex aequo in Oporto). Spread throughout the text other issues, such as the 
depathologization of trans* people, are also brought to the fore to exemplify other highly volatile 
points of contention.  
As an alternative, Sérgio Vitorino makes a call for intersectionality and identifies that conflict 
as a “growth crisis, a painful transition” where “new blood” is not just entering the movement but, 
“is partly already there”, and is facing resistance from the “older” sector of the movement. 
Miguel Vale de Almeida’s response came shortly after, and took the form of a presentation at 
the Feminist Congress, held in Lisbon, in June 2008. (A remark should be made here: Vale de 
Almeida himself wrote that he had another theme planned, based on Gayle Rubin’s famous 
“Thinking Sex” and the notion that the LGBT movement must be feminist; an intriguing 
informational tidbit considering the emphasis that Rubin placed on the politics of excluding non-
normative sexual practices such as non-monogamy in her analysis.) Vale de Almeida used 
Vitorino’s text to perform an “analysis of discursive formations” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 5). 
According to Vale de Almeida, Vitorino’s text makes three important assumptions or rhetorical 
moves: 
“a) it seems to intend to institute a policy of radicalness through the creation of a normalizing Other, 
ultimately dependent on heteronormativity; 
b) it seems to partake in the notion of an emancipatory or even revolutionary historical becoming, 
utopic in its nature, that relegates the Other to a time-stuck conservatism; 
c) and does both these things by using some “symbolic dramas” that allow the instauration of clear 
diacritical signals that point to a “parting of the waters” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 4). 
                                                 
3
 All translations from non-English to English are my own, as is the responsibility for any mis-translation or 
loss of sense in the process. 
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Placing himself as this stereotyped Other (or as its mouthpiece), Vale de Almeida then goes 
on to clarify that there are three errors that lie behind these assumptions: he posits that asking 
for equality is not adhering to a given model (where equality is defined as “equality in accessing 
what there is (marriage)” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 5)); that the critique of polyamory is a 
matter of tactics rather than of values; and, ultimately, that Vitorino’s text is based on a 
“confusion between two levels of reflection and action in any social movement, especially those 
that deal with costumes – that of policies and that of cultural critique”. 
It is on this third point that most of the rest of the text is focused. According to the text, 
concrete political actions involve the “management of the possible”, which operate in a different 
sphere and at a different speed in regards to “radical cultural critique” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, 
p. 7). It is then unjust, according to Vale de Almeida, to equate a liberal perspective (of that 
‘Other’) with a backwards one, one that does not understand the History to come. This 
accusation of backwardness would be employed, one assumes, by a post-modern vision of non-
fixed identities – the same one that makes “good bed partners (even if unintendedly) with a 
hyper-liberalism that assumes that people choose to be what they want, without social 
constraints, as a reproduction of the relationship between the economic agent and the market” 
(Vale de Almeida, 2008, pp. 8, 9), in what can be considered a gross misrepresentation of post-
modernist/queer theory. For the author, then, it is possible to do: 
“three things at the same time: to think, with social theory, about the history, sociology and 
anthropology of gender and sexuality; to promote a radical cultural critique which includes the 
visibility of diverse experimentations and aesthetics of life; and to practice a politics of the possible 
and of the concrete in seeking to fulfill the liberal project in the sexuality and gender area. I defend 
that there should be no strategic hierarchy between the three, but a dynamic tension and a tactical 
separation” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 10). 
The risk of having cultural critique play too big of a role is that it cannot, apparently, be 
directly translated into political action without losing the “capacity for transforming the concrete 
situations in the field of [social] rights”, and so these two approaches “cannot attack each other 
when it comes to strategy” (idem). 
What I would now like to demonstrate is how the three rhetorical moves pointed out in Vale 
de Almeida’s analysis of Vitorino’s text are, themselves, also present in his own text. I intend to 
demonstrate that irony is unwillingly thus produced, and Vale de Almeida’s critique can just as 
well be turned against itself, becoming more than what the author intended, opening up the 
space for a meta-critique. This unintended irony occurs in three distinct points that the author 
raises: 
1. Radicality: the first critique is that Vitorino’s text claims for itself and its views a radicality 
that would be lacking in the Other thus created (meaning, in the position Vale de 
Almeida identifies with); but after exposing what he considers to be a false dichotomy 
between cultural critique and the politics of the possible, Vale de Almeida then says that 
“in the current circumstances, given how the liberal project in the field of sexuality is still 
unfulfilled, the greatest radicality might, curiously, be in the fight for formal equality” 
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(Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 9, emphasis mine). By using ‘radical’ as a positively 
connoted value, Vale de Almeida’s text reinstates the power of ‘being radical’, and 
reinstates radicalness as a desirable category of political action, or at least as a pointer 
to its value in “transforming people’s lives for the better”. The actual meaning of 
radicality here is not clarified, though. If the politics of the possible is indeed something 
separate from the cultural critique then it is not clear how the liberal project of formal 
equality is able to access or address itself to the root of the issues – the original 
meaning of ‘radical’ – when its objective is assumedly not that one. This becomes 
particularly complicated by the assertion that “’liberal’ can end up being more ‘radical’ 
and vice-versa”, and that “this is evident when thinking more critically about the 
opposition between identitary politics and queer politics, in which the first one might 
even be closer to forms of radical cultural critique” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 11). No 
argument is offered as explanation for this role reversal, nor is a definition of this 
radicality put forward to help clarify if there is more than one radicality at stake here. 
2. Historicity and teleology: at the same time that the text refutes what is an apparent 
historical teleology created by Vitorino when talking about “new blood”, maintains the 
notion that there is a liberal project that might eventually be fulfilled by the deliberate 
action of social actors mobilizing according to that project. But, it must be said, 
Vitorino’s text is equally clear in pointing out that the idea that “it is coming” is linked to 
the observation that it is “partly already there”, and in supplying ample examples of 
other communities and activist groups/topics that are already mobilizing and planning 
and/or executing a push for more visibility, more rights, more voices. It is, again, 
ironically unclear how it is that the liberal project is not historically teleological (in the 
sense that it foretells a future to be constructed by willing people), while the queer 
project (which is just as contingent on the efforts of willing sexual citizens as the liberal 
one) is considered to be historically teleological. 
3. Parting of waters, roles and diacritical signs: Vale de Almeida’s text criticizes the idea 
that there is “old blood” and “new blood”, and that certain specific events function as 
markers that allow someone to distinguish between the old and the new, the identitary 
and legalist, versus the queer and grassroots activist; according to him, Vitorino’s text 
creates unnecessary dichotomies. And yet, at the same time, the text creates a series 
of separate (although related and connected) functions for radical cultural critique and 
for the politics of the possible, while mentioning the dangers of mixing those waters 
(that is: losing the power to effect social or political changes). Here, it is the modes of 
engagement with the social fabric and the (supposed?) results that operate as the 
diacritical signs that serve to separate these two discourses. Making the difference even 
more salient (thus making the critique of dichotomizing even more ironical), the “radical 
cultural critique” is presented as being impossible to translate into “political action”. This, 
in turn, serves to reinforce the notion that the ‘liberal project’ is more radical (and thus 
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more valuable, worthy, dignifiable), predicating that evaluation on the same 
dichotomizing gesture that is criticized in Vitorino’s text. 
Given the above apparent contradictions between critique and counter-critique, I would now 
like to advance the idea that this, too, creates a process of Othering, that should give pause in 
considering what ‘radical’ means to the ‘liberal project’. Thus, and again pointing out that the 
concepts of justice and equality seem to be central to that project as it is presented by Vale de 
Almeida, I would like to follow the argument (and more particularly, the questions behind it) put 
forth by Santos (2013, p. 61): “it is no longer enough to claim equality (whose equality?) and 
celebrate legal changes in the name of inclusive justice (whose inclusion? whose exclusion? 
whose justice?)”. 
So, who’s ‘we’? Who is encompassed by this “formal equality”, to use Vale de Almeida’s 
term, who does it Other, and by what means? 
3. POLYAMORY, BUT NOT REALLY – ‘[CITATION NEEDED]’ AND 
MISREPRESENTING THE OTHER 
I will now focus on polyamory as the main example of this excluded Other and attempt to 
demonstrate how the rhetoric of exclusion is employed by Vale de Almeida to produce, 
legitimize and strategically necessitate the erasure of the act of exclusion itself – in such a way 
that the exclusion becomes (theoretically) unidentifiable, as there is (apparently) nothing to 
exclude. 
Vale de Almeida’s paper puts the matter to rest in one fell swoop:  
“Polyamory is not a problem. This is because polyamory presents itself as a lifestyle choice, a 
choice to follow a given set of values within the context of amorous relationships. It does not 
present itself as a political claim for legislative or rights’ changes”; “given that it’s an ethical choice 
in the field of romantic relationships, it has nothing to do with a transformative agenda of the 
conditions of citizenship” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, pp. 5, 6).  
What is perhaps the most jarring thing about this excerpt is its utter lack of citations, 
especially considering that this was a presentation at an academic conference. Polyamory is 
presented self-evidently as a “lifestyle choice”, without any theoretical development, without any 
pointers to authors that might back-up or disavow that (non-)definition; later, in the 2009 version 
of the paper, a clearer definition appears - “polyamory describes amorous arrangements with 
more than one partner, with mutual consent and without a project of fidelity” (Vale de Almeida, 
2009, p. 4) – but without any sourced references
4
. Moreover, and given that it makes an 
assumption as to what polyamory represents for polyamorous people (and how one can only 
                                                 
4
 The focus on love and the non-problematization of the meaning of “fidelity” as a supposed marker of non-
polyamorous (be it ‘monogamous’) relationships are very contentious points in this definition, and do not 
align with most theory or research on the subject or on the origins of the word (Cardoso, 2010, 2011; 
Haritaworn, Lin, & Klesse, 2006; Keener, 2004; McCullough, 2003; Mint, 2008; Ritchie & Barker, 2006). 
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become polyamorous), this (mis-)presentation of polyamory is emphatically absent of empirical 
explorations of the subject that might legitimate such a claim. 
Equally lacking is a more in-depth exploration of the overlap (and the non-overlap) between 
polyamory and polygamy, and between gender and polyamory – according to the text, there 
would only be a political claim behind polyamory if it were “polygamy”. The word “polygamy” is 
used here with an unclear meaning – does it mean the possibility of a civil, legal marriage 
between more than two people?, or does it mean just the existence of a sexual connection 
between more than two people? 
The next excerpt adds to the conceptual confusion: “[…] if there were [a polygamous 
demand for legal recognition], it would be, and rightly so, contested, since mutual consent would 
not be enough to allay the fear of deep gender inequalities” (Vale de Almeida, 2008, p. 6). Does 
“polygamous” here actually mean ‘polygynous’? And where do the “deep gender inequalities” 
come into play, unless it was referring to a strictly heterosexual relationship pattern? Are 
heterosexual relationships the ones that might suffer from gendered issues, and would those 
fears be then effectively allayed if it were a purely lesbian/homosexual polygamous family? 
(Seemingly not (Santos, 2012).) And although Vale de Almeida is clear to point out that 
polyamory is not polygamy, the text also seems to imply that, definitionally, polyamory cannot 
make any political demands without becoming (heterosexual, patriarchal?) polygamy, bringing 
with it “deep gender inequalities”, which would then be, quoting Vale de Almeida, “rightly so” 
contested. Further, such a phrasing refuses to acknowledge that the meaning and practices 
behind the word “polyamory” might differ between people and be connected to different 
practices and that “social and legal marginalization of polyamorous affiliations may exacerbate 
inequality within these relationships” (Ertman, 2005, p. 491). Once again the irony returns: only 
heteronormative practices are allowed recognition in the field of politics. 
By virtue of the above, then, polyamory is seemingly outside of an identity politics 
framework, prohibited from belonging there by being “a lifestyle choice”. This is, of course, the 
very same argument that has been leveraged for decades against LGBT people, who stand 
accused of ‘choosing to be gay’ (or otherwise deviant) and of having the possibility of 
‘converting’ or ‘healing’ back into proper (hetero-)sexuality. And although Vale de Almeida’s text 
clearly and repeatedly states that individual lives should not be judged and criticized, it still 
deploys the exact same rhetoric that many in the LGBT movement (and within both Social and 
Natural Sciences) have tried to invalidate, by demonstrating the natural-ness of homosexuality 
and other forms of sexuality (thus removing ethics and choice from the framework, and making 
those forms of sexuality – the ones that are backed by ‘natural’ arguments – ontologically 
superior to, in this case, polyamory). It also ignores that in ‘homosexuality’ as in ‘polyamory’, 
essentialist narratives exist alongside anti-essentialist ones (e.g.: Foucault (1994) or Halperin 
(2002), and Keener (2004)). 
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At the same time, Vale de Almeida claims that “polyamory has a political value”, but only a 
very specific one: “the opening of the possible, the cultural critique that demonstrates that there 
are other ways to live”; and even so, “little is actually new in polyamory”, providing as examples 
the “sexual libertarianism of the utopic socialist projects of the 19
th
 century, Reich’s and others’ 
sexual radicalism in the 20
th
 century or, skipping ahead in time, May 1968” (Vale de Almeida, 
2008, p. 6). This erases continuities and discontinuities between non-monogamous projects that 
have happened across centuries of distance and fails to account for the growing media 
representation and partial globalization of a specific English word/notion, its seeming endurance 
to the passage of time and its democratization. In short, it seemingly denies polyamory its 
political, theoretical, contextual and anthropological depth (or even the need for such things), 
equating it with other (white, European and privileged) forms of consensual non-monogamy, 
and restricting its political usefulness to the role of simply being a reminder of Otherness. 
The argument from Vale de Almeida’s perspective is, then, that polyamory is not excluded 
and Othered, because there is fundamentally nothing to exclude. There is no possible 
translation to the plane of concrete political action that would be defensible, either, and 
therefore the ‘real’ political existence of polyamory is doubly disavowed. This argument is only 
supported through straw-men fallacies, or misrepresentations, of polyamory and the confusion 
created by the lack of a systematic literature review of consensual non-monogamies in general 
(of which polyamory is a subset), especially as it pertains to the relations between polyamory 
and feminist theory (Cardoso, 2009, 2010; Haritaworn, Lin, & Klesse, 2006; Sheff, 2005, 2006), 
which, given the context where the text was originally presented, is incomprehensible.  
Furthermore, the notion that polyamory is not translatable, in an ethical manner, into law, 
contradicts the fact that there are several scholarly references that deal with just that and with 
the relation (be it pro, con, or other) between polyamorous activism and monogamous same-sex 
marriage (Ashbee, 2007; Aviram, 2008; Black, 2006; Emens, 2004; Ertman, 2005; Myers, 2009; 
Strassberg, 2003), as well as authors who argue that the definition of sexual orientation should 
be expanded to include polyamory under the aegis of any anti-discrimination laws already in 
place (Tweedy, 2011). All in all, if monogamy is regulated by the State, its contestation must 
(Vitorino, 2009), per force, be also at the level of what Vale de Almeida would term “concrete 
politics”. Thus, I argue here that pushing polyamory outside of the scope of “concrete politics” 
constitutes a form of Othering, which results in an exclusionist theoretical positioning, with 
practical consequences for the lives of consensually non-monogamous people.  
Even more problematic is a derived assertion put forth in Vale de Almeida’s text, that further 
advances this exclusionist rhetoric: “what there is, is the danger of a social and media reading – 
wrong, for sure, but no less dangerous because of that – of polyamory as polygamy, which 
would hurt what some (me, for example) consider to be a priority, since it’s closer to being 
accomplished”; and, further down, “[polyamory] cannot be used to alienate those who, in 
exerting their right to choose, would want to follow other relational models” (Vale de Almeida, 
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2008, p. 6). Therefore, beyond being interpreted as untranslatable to the realm of practical 
politics, polyamory is further conceptualized as being potentially hazardous. Not by, or in and of 
itself, but inasmuch as there is the possibility that it might be “wrongly” interpreted by the media 
and by society. There are, then, three elements to consider here: first, there is the admission of 
a slippery slope fallacy as such; second, there is the hypothetical fear of both a media panic and 
a moral panic (although, again, the scholarly references to these widely studied and theorized 
phenomena are absent); third, there is the contention that, in spite of not validating such 
(hypothetical) arguments, there is a need to act upon them, and thus to grant them their full 
power. This is because, curiously, there is an apparent reversal in the power positions occupied 
by different social actors – even though the legal recognition of monogamous same-sex 
marriage is “closer to being accomplished” (with all that it implicates in terms of social 
recognition and leverage), such an accomplishment risks being undone, since polyamory would 
be used to alienate the defenders of monogamous same-sex marriage by being confused with 
polygamy. 
Such an assumption seems to come from a simplistic view of how moral and media panics 
work especially, following both recent and not-so-recent criticisms (Buckingham & Strandgaard 
Jensen, 2012; McRobbie & Thornton, 1995), when in such a multi-mediated and plural world the 
notion of a uniformly polarizing media stance is nigh impossible, where several social actors 
compete and have access to different media as well as being granted a modicum of exposure. 
Even taking into account the assertion that “all media are not created equal, that some are 
vastly more powerful than others” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 100), and thus more able to 
function as gate-keepers and agenda-setters, what remains unexplained is why the text 
assumes that any efforts to oppose such a (hypothetical) moral backlash would be fruitless, and 
that the alienation of monogamous same-sex marriage defenders would be successful. This 
again seems to ignore the fact that the (admittedly very sparse) media coverage that exists 
around polyamory in Portugal
5
 is, overall, not pathologizing, demonizing or otherwise imbued 
with the characteristics that are usually the hallmark of what defines a media/moral panic 
(Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009), but rather is celebratory and even historically teleological in 
presenting polyamory as ‘new’ or as ‘the future of relationships’ (which is obviously problematic 
too (Zanin, 2013)). It also overlooks LGBT movement’s (sans polyamory), and the organization 
of which Vale de Almeida is an important figure (ILGA Portugal) in particular, capacity to attract 
media, political and social attention – or the power differential it creates.  
This does not mean that public exposure to the idea of polyamory would be inconsequential 
at all or that the slippery slope would not be utilized politically, only that the specific outcomes 
are unforeseeable, and even more so when it comes to the way it would affect a high-level 
political decision such as the legalization of monogamous same-sex marriage. Besides, if the 
                                                 
5
 Some of it is available here: http://poliamor.pt/imprensa.html (Portuguese only); other references, 
including materials from Brazil and Spain, are also available here, with a synopsis in English: 
http://polyinthemedia.blogspot.pt/search/label/Portugu%C3%AAs  
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objective of the liberal project is, according to Vale de Almeida (2008) to secure happiness for 
citizens, then visibility (in its political sense) would also benefit polyamorous people, and thus 
constitute a beneficial consequence that the text doesn’t seem to comprise. 
Again there is a trace of irony, since the above argument – which is about identitary and 
political purity – is routinely used against the liberal LGBT movement when it comes to: 
monogamous same-sex marriage, namely by those that see it as a devaluation of the meaning, 
importance and symbolism of ‘marriage’; trans* people, for muddying and confusing ‘the waters’ 
of the sex-gender system; and bisexual, asexual or pansexual people, for confusing and 
polluting ‘sexual orientation’. If it is possible to educate the public about these issues, why would 
it not be possible to do the same around polyamory, given that there is not conflict of interests 
between advocating for polyamory and, for instance, monogamous same-sex marriage? It 
appears as though the phantasmatic threat of moral/media panics operates as the sole validator 
of the exclusion of polyamory in this regard. 
The third element of how Vale de Almeida’s text (mis-)represents polyamory, concerns the 
actual intersections between LGB people and polyamory or other forms of consensual non-
monogamy. The text talks addresses the fact that many people “question marriage itself, to 
reject heteronormative forms of behavior and relationships, to question jealousy and sexual 
exclusivity, etc, just like generations and generations of gays and lesbians who had to practice 
cultural, discursive, performative and aesthetic configurations that would question 
heteronormativity” (2008, p. 6, my emphasis). This comparison supposedly instantiates a 
differential between two supposed separate groups. The usage of “just like” effectively draws a 
connecting line between what is called “cultural critique” and the everyday experiences of a 
micro-politics of intimate citizenship (Plummer, 1994), offering up a third element beyond that of 
“concrete politics”. But at the same time, it seems to create a difference between the 
experiences of people who question marriage, jealousy and sexual exclusivity, and gays and 
lesbians – according to the text, the first group fights mononormativity (another academic 
concept that fails to find its way into Vale de Almeida’s paper, from Pieper and Bauer (2005)) 
and the second fights heteronormativity. If one(s) is “just like” the other(s), then they are not the 
Other(s).  
By separating “Us” from the “Others”, a double erasure is created, one that does not take 
into account the fundamental role of intersectionality in experiences of discrimination and 
alienation against standardized sexualities, affects and expressions of gender. I would like here 
to reiterate the comment that Vale de Almeida made about his original intention to talk about 
“heteronormativity as a structuring condition both of sexism and of homophobia” (Vale de 
Almeida, 2008, p. 2) using the work of Gayle Rubin. Her work is indeed of use to this paper, 
since in the ‘Charmed Circle’ she draws, monogamy is an important part of what constitutes 
acceptable (and thus, privileged, and potentially oppressive) sexuality and intimacy (Rubin, 
2007). For Rubin, all of these different elements are not interchangeable, and all need to be 
LES Online, Vol. 6, No 1 (2014) 
 
56 
 
considered when giving an account of the critical interactions between sexually marginalized 
groups and their normative surroundings. This is why I use the term ‘double erasure’ – the 
tensional engagement that responsible non-monogamous people have with normative gender 
rules and heterosexism on the one hand (Ritchie & Barker, 2006; Sheff, 2006; Wilkins, 2004), 
and on the other, the fact that the “performative and aesthetic forms” they engage in, to fight a 
heteronormative society, actually include a sizable dose of consensual and ethical non-
monogamy. One example of this is Elisabeth Sheff’s (2014, p. 71) ethnographic work, where 
she points out that “there is considerable overlap between polyamorous communities and other 
subcultures including […] other sexual minorities such as kinksters, bisexuals, swingers, and 
gays and lesbians”. 
Another source is the 2012 ‘Loving More’ Survey (Cox II, Fleckenstein, & Bergstrand, 2012) 
made for polyamorous and other responsibly non-monogamous people (with about 4000 self-
selected respondents, and heavily biased towards an Anglophone audience), where 52% of 
women said they had relationship(s) with someone of the same gender or with people of the 
same and of the opposite gender; and about 23% of the men said the same thing. This means 
that 40% of the ‘Loving More’ sample was at the time (also) having non-heterosexual 
relationships; elsewhere more studies supporting these findings are mentioned (Robinson, 
2013, pp. 25, 29). 
Although these statistics are far from representative, they raise the plausible hypothesis that 
a relevant portion of the LGB community deals not only with heteronormativity, but with 
mononormativity and its inherent sexism constantly, in their performative and aesthetic pursuits 
– an intersection of discriminations that, once again, raises the pressing questions quoted 
above: “whose inclusion? whose exclusion? whose justice?”. The dichotomy between non-
monogamous people on the one hand, and LGB people on the other – even if we shorten that 
to ‘LGB people who want to be in a legal monogamous same-sex marriage’ – becomes a fictive 
and ideological one. And even for those who might desire such a marriage and non-monogamy 
– with the accompanying ‘happiness’, social recognition and equality – it is doubtful whether 
having that part of their experience (past, present or future) erased, denied or excluded in the 
very same context of the groups and associations that are fighting for ‘their’ rights and ‘their’ 
happiness (the one that comes from a life free of discrimination) actually brings said happiness; 
nor does it dispel the normative power behind happiness (Ahmed, 2010). 
For this third critique, I would like to, again, make a comparison with the discriminatory 
practices that are present in mainstream heteronormative discourse. By defining certain terms 
(marriage, love, family, sex, sexuality) as ‘inherently’ heterosexual, heteronomative society 
makes use of its definitional privilege, and erases sexual, intimate and amorous experiences 
that might not fit into those definitions. This erasure, like the one identified above, is double: 
non-heterosexually identified people are erased or made to feel ontologically inferior, and non-
normative acts, even by hetero-identified people, are also subject to this erasure or 
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unintelligibility. It is as if gay/lesbian/bisexual and straight were necessarily non-intersecting 
groups, as if identities and acts did not, at times, become confusingly enmeshed. 
While the previous section had concluded with a critical analysis of Vale de Almeida’s text 
through the lens of the author’s critique of Vitorino’s essay, this section tries to draw 
substantiated parallelisms between the rhetorical strategies utilized to define and arguably 
exclude polyamory from even the possibility of effecting direct political changes, and those used 
by hetero-mono-normative sexist and patriarchal institutions to attempt to exclude the LGBT 
movement from effecting direct political changes itself. 
4. IS “POLITICS OF THE POSSIBLE” STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM?, 
OR WHO’S GOT THE BIGGEST SPIVAK? 
This section intends to show why Vale de Almeida claims that this Othering is actually a valid 
political stance under the concept of “strategic essentialism”, but also attempts to demonstrate 
how such an argument can only be made by misrepresenting what strategic essentialism is and 
how it operates. 
Vale de Almeida’s “politics of the possible” seems to be based upon another premise, not yet 
analyzed here: the “strategy” that governs the applicability of the principles of the “concrete 
politics within western democracies”, which “works, indeed, in an identitary mode”. Within the 
context of Vale de Almeida’s 2008 text, this is a rather cryptic remark, but the 2009 version 
makes it clearer in its title, which integrates Spivak’s notion of “strategic essentialism”. In that 
paper, Vale de Almeida defines strategic essentialism as “a kind of temporary solidarity aimed 
at social action” (Vale de Almeida, 2009, p. 2). Spivak herself points towards strategic 
essentialism as a way to create a place from which the subaltern could speak and defy the 
privileged group’s ability to define the subaltern and speak as if on the subaltern’s behalf 
(Spivak, 1994). Spivak also adds that strategic essentialism is not an acceptance of ‘essence’ 
as truth, but as a creation that requires constant critique and deconstruction, so it does not 
become, itself, essentialized, or crystalized in a way that stops being strategic.  
Thus, given the above considerations on how polyamory is rhetorically misrepresented, two 
questions follow: is there solidarity between Vale de Almeida’s critique of Vitorino’s text and the 
PolyPortugal activist group?, and, is the subaltern speaking? 
To engage with these issues, I would again turn to intersectionality and its operation in the 
accumulation of experiences of Othering and discrimination. If indeed there are exclusionary 
narratives being deployed in the representation of polyamory by Vale de Almeida’s text, as I’ve 
argued, and they are being made in the name of a social group (engaged in said strategic 
essentialism) that is about to have a highly symbolic political victory, does this not point to 
shades of (relative) privilege and, thus, to multiple levels of subalterity being created or 
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maintained? Can the denial of political relevance to a given identity (or to the subjects beyond it) 
be considered solidarity, and the creation of the conditions necessary for more voices to make 
themselves heard? Beyond the affirmation that cultural critique is necessary, what strategic and 
theoretical consequences are derived from the critique that polyamory admittedly raises? In 
promoting a specific form of exclusion, this strategy creates silence, and denies the notion of a 
participatory, encompassing and respectful laying out of plans that would give voice to all sorts 
of subalterns.  
In fact, and given some of the re-appropriations of her work, Spivak herself has, in a way, 
distanced herself from the notion of strategic essentialism, especially where a claim of strategic 
essentialism is made while social actors concurrently engage in actions that are contrary to the 
ideal informing strategic essentialism. Spivak is particularly clear when she claims that “the 
critical moment does not come only at a certain stage when one sees one’s efforts succeeding. 
It is not in that moment that we begin to decide that we had been strategic all along” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 4), which seems a fitting discussion to what the Portuguese LGBT movement was on 
the edge of accomplishing.  
Ultimately, it seems then that what Spivak properly understands as being “strategic 
essentialism” deals with a very specific context of total erasure or negation of a given social 
identity, where strategic essentialism would reflexively create the cognitive tools necessary to 
talk about and against that negation. For strategic essentialism to be deployed, the move should 
be, “ideally, self-conscious for all mobilized” (Spivak, 2012, p. 4). This, then, does not seem to 
apply to a situation of privilege that can often be seen within certain academic and social 
contexts, such as the one from where Vale de Almeida’s papers come from. Spivak’s concept 
applies rather to anti-colonialist practices where a strategy indeed exists, one “that changes 
moment to moment, and [where the subalterns] in fact come asserting their differences as they 
use the mobilized unity to do some specific thing” (Spivak, 2012, p. 14). 
João Manuel de Oliveira, who also analyzes the homonormative tendencies behind the 
importance afforded to the fight for monogamous same-sex marriage in Portugal by resorting to 
Spivak and critiquing Vale de Almeida, notes that the recently passed legislation does nothing 
to “substantially alter the subject positions” (Oliveira, 2013, p. 72), instead maintaining the same 
core values as before – and thus, has little or nothing to do with the strategies put forth by 
Spivak. In fact, for Oliveira, this is a prime example of how “even a political effort for equality can 
be made to signify a privileging of the already-privileged” (2013, p. 72). 
Such a description seems to me a far cry from the request (imposition?) for silence implicit in 
the aforementioned media/moral panics, or in the denial that there is a possible practical 
political side to polyamory. Quite the contrary – it seems as if a utilitarian calculation of gains 
and losses is being done, and the social group with ‘the biggest Spivak’ (meaning, the biggest 
apparent claim to being subordinate, with the best apparently thought-out strategy) is the one 
with the rights to mobilization, to discourse, to representation, to acknowledgement of political 
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validity, “when one sees one’s efforts succeeding”, as Spivak puts it – a coopting of strategic 
essentialism. 
And so, I’d like to echo a question raised by Richard Miskolci (2010, p. 5), in response to the 
second text of Vale de Almeida: “Wouldn’t the so called queer represent the phantasmic 
incarnation of the abject, within the LGBT social movement itself?” The figure of the queer (and 
here, particularly, of the polyamorous person as a political entity) operates then as a “catalyst 
for the established fears” of “social backlash” (Miskolci, 2010, p. 5), while, at the same time, the 
role of social critique is separated from the role of concrete politics, which Miskolci refers to as 
anti-intellectualism. 
Miskolci identifies 
“an internal resistance to the widening of the dialogue with feminism, to the creation of a more 
critical dialogue towards the State, and to the end of the identitary model of the [LGBT] little letters 
that exists alongside a new conceptual and theoretical framework in the field of sexualities studies” 
(Miskolci, 2010, p. 10). 
Cristina Santos a similar interpretation, which this paper supports – that rather than the 
deployment of strategic essentialism, what we see Vale de Almeida defending is the 
continuation of a “politics of containment, whereby controversial issues are negotiated amongst 
liberal and conservative sectors of society […] to achieve a wider consensus through the 
suspension of radical strategies or arguments” (Santos, 2013, pp. 3, 4). 
In fact, the reactions to PolyPortugal are one of the examples Santos offers, calling it 
“striking” that such arguments came from “an LGBT committee organizing an LGBT march 
which, one would have thought, would hold the principle of diversity as non-negotiable” (Santos, 
2013, p. 5), thus creating processes of (necessarily hierarchical) Othering, where only some 
forms of relationship “are given legal and cultural recognition at the same time that other 
relationships are distinguished as those of sexual dissidents who are construed as unworthy, 
illegitimate and improper” (Santos, 2013, p. 7). Santos links this to homonormativity and 
homonationalism, arguing for a closer look at the relationship between State and activism, and 
pointing out that “the excessive juridification of LGBT politics […] seems to assume that legal 
frameworks can deliver fairness and justice per se”, in stark contrast to Vale de Almeida’s 
naturalization of “management of the possible” as being another way to define “concrete 
politics” (Vale de Almeida, 2009, p. 5) – which places Vale de Almeida’s arguments far away 
from strategic essentialism. 
5. CONCLUSION: A “POLITICS OF THE POSSIBLE” DEPENDS ON 
SOMEONE IMAGINING THE POSSIBLE  
In another text, co-authored with Patrícia Louro and Bruno Maia (also from the Pink 
Panthers), that functions as a sort of response to Vale de Almeida and to the situation of the 
Portuguese LGBT movement of the time, Sérgio Vitorino writes that “’the possible’ is mutable, 
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according to the existing conditions, but also according to the ambition, vision and giving-ins of 
its actors” (Maia et al., 2009, p. 134). For these authors, a narrow understanding of “the 
possible” makes a “clean slate of diversity in the name of the interest of the majority, thus 
hurting the visibility of diversity” (Maia et al., 2009, p. 136). 
Even though this paper focuses on critically engaging with Vale de Almeida’s texts, it is 
nevertheless worth mentioning that, in the activist context of Portugal, where individual people 
and collective organizations sometimes seem impossible to pick apart, a given theoretical 
(cultural?) critique such as is undertaken by Vale de Almeida, oftentimes has very concrete 
political applications. This is one such case – ILGA Portugal, along with Rede ex aequo, 
spearheaded the push against PolyPortugal being part of the organization of the LGBT Pride 
parade in Lisbon during 2008 and 2009 (Vitorino, 2009), in spite of PolyPortugal having helped 
to found the Oporto Pride parade in 2006 and having participated in its organization ever since. 
In the case of the Oporto Pride, the Rede ex aequo refuses to associate itself publicly with 
polyamory, and thus refuses to participate in the organizing of the Oporto Pride parade. 
Writing on behalf of the Pink Panthers, and calling out to the participation in 2009’s Oporto 
Pride March, Vitorino again questions the double standards applied to what constitutes an 
“LGBT topic”, given that anti-racism is accepted as one, but polyamory is not (Vitorino, 2009). 
He also casts doubts on the notion that being more moderate is a necessity to winning the 
debate on monogamous same-sex marriage, instead pointing to a strategy of silence as a 
strategy of oppression, such as the one that trans* people already have to go through, being 
doubly silenced in the process. What’s more, Vitorino adds that “Miguel Vale de Almeida 
ignores that polyamory is a political project, by the simple fact that it deals with State-regulated 
relationships”; therefore, even in the absence of a “cultural critique of relationship exclusivity”, 
polyamory would always and already be political (Vitorino, 2009). 
Polyamory, then, needs to be included alongside other even-less-visible minorities in the 
movement’s construction of what is “possible”. The narrowing down of this ‘possible’ constitutes 
a “politics of containment” (Santos, 2013, my emphasis) and a “consolation citizenship” 
(Oliveira, 2013, my emphasis). Although these authors utilize different expressions and make 
separate analyses, they follow a common reasoning, in considering the complicity between a 
heavy focus on the legal possibility of monogamous same-sex marriage and neo-liberal, 
homonormative and homonational perspectives, that ends up reproducing problematic gender, 
class and even heterosexual privileges. 
Thus, “consolation” and “containment” are in fact two aspects of the same dynamic. As per 
Oliveira’s critical reading, the ‘proper’ response that comes out of neo-liberal imaginings of what 
is ‘possible’ would be the legal recognition of monogamous same-sex marriage as an 
undisputed victory, an “end in itself for citizenship”, but that in the end maintains “an illusion of 
democracy that only applies to some social positions” and that “only includes those that can 
already be included” (Oliveira, 2013, pp. 73, 75). Santos (2013, p. 8) talks about the “excessive 
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juridification of LGBT politics” as a containment strategy that intends to bring about that very 
same, and very ‘proper’, ‘possible’ (with which some citizens can then be consoled) – what is 
contained is the corporeal, sexual, erotic messiness of embodied citizenship that might threaten 
the emergence of a clean juridical (LGBT?) subject worthy of being bestowed a role in an 
imagined social struggle for ‘The Future’ (and where promiscuity would have no place, or at 
least no political place). 
This emphasis on ‘The Future’ is what Lee Edelman calls 
“reproductive futurism: […] an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the 
process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the 
political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal 
relations” (Edelman, 2004, p. 2). 
Such futurism is eloquently pointed out by Cristina Santos’ (2013, p. 7) analysis of the then 
Prime Minister’s speech in defense of the law for monogamous same-sex marriage. In it, he 
made “use of conservative yardsticks of the next generation (‘our children’), tradition and 
honour”. Returning to Vale de Almeida, we see that the ‘politics of the possible’ his texts defend 
are a prime example of conceptualizing “every political vision as a vision of futurity” (Edelman, 
2004, p. 13), bringing with it “a logic of repetition that fixes identity through identification with the 
future of the social order” (2004, p. 25); such a repetition is precisely what confirms and 
maintains the privileges discussed above. 
For Edelman, resisting this closing down of what is possible means refusing futurity as the 
leitmotif for political action, or imagining politics beyond (and besides) futurity and social 
reproduction. As Oliveira (2013, p. 76), and Bruno Maia et alli (2009, p. 135) make clear, 
reducing this argument to pro- or anti- marriage (of whatever form), or to pro- or anti- juridical 
struggles is to simplify a much wider critique of representativity, political visibility and legitimacy 
affordance to different bodies, performances, erotic and emotional lives; it is also to overlook the 
fact that there are no inherently contradictory objectives or irreconcilable strategies (Sheff, 2011, 
p. 510) 
Instead of purifying Plummer’s (1994) sexual citizens and their narratives, a politics of the 
possible can and should also be about the possibility of being dirty, transgressive, ultra-
minoritary, undefined or undefinable – but never of being oppressed, silenced and forcefully 
rendered apolitical. 
Such a politics can never forget that supporting “the idea that coupledom should be the 
marker of citizenship” (Wilkinson, 2013, p. 7) “may in fact contribute to the structural inequalities 
and problems that society faces” (Wilkinson, 2010, p. 52). Overall, this paper intends to give 
some insight as to how some proponents of monogamous same-sex marriage will employ 
similar rhetorical devices and operations of Othering as those used by conservative anti-LGBT 
social actors, towards other sexual and intimate dissidents, thus combining homonormativity 
with mononormativity. 
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